Social reproduction of ‘classes of labour’ in the rural areas of South Africa: contradictions and contestations by Cousins, Ben et al.
Cousins, B. et al. (2018). Social reproduction of ‘classes of labour’ in the rural areas of South 
Africa: contradictions and contestations.  
The Journal of Peasant Studies, 45(5-6): 1060-1085.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1482876       
  
 
University of the Western Cape Research Repository                                                                              bcousins@plaas.org.za      
 
Social reproduction of ‘classes of labour’ in the rural areas of South 
Africa: contradictions and contestations 
 
Ben Cousins, Alex Dubb, Donna Hornby and Farai Mtero 
 
Abstract 
Marxist agrarian political economy has focused largely on the problematic of accumulation 
and its politics, but the dynamics of social reproduction in rural contexts remain somewhat 
undertheorised. These are explored through consideration of empirical evidence from 
communal areas and land reform farms in South Africa. Key arguments advanced are that 
social reproduction in such contexts include the reproduction of distinctive forms of 
marriage, systems of kinship and community membership, as well as of property relations 
that are not characterised by private ownership. Much social reproduction occurs outside of 
(direct) market relations, but it is nevertheless deeply conditioned and shaped by the 
dynamics of the wider capitalist economy, including in relation to wage labour and small-
scale agricultural production. As a result, social reproduction in rural areas involves 
contradictions, tensions and contestations, and these are often at the centre of local forms of 
politics. The wider significance of these findings is discussed, and it is suggested that similar 
dynamics may be at work across the Global South. 
 
Introduction 
Marxist agrarian political economy has tended to focus on accumulation problematics, 
which were central in classic debates on the Agrarian Question (Byres 1996), which is 
understandable given the overall dominance of the logic of capital in a capitalist world. 
Within these debates, discussion of small-scale agriculture was largely orientated to 
questions surrounding accumulation (from ‘above’, ‘below’, or in some combination) and 
their historical or prospective contribution to national development. This concern was key 
in Africa, given  the  large  proportion of small-scale  producers,  both  before  and following 
national independence, notwithstanding ongoing processes (permanent, non-permanent 
and cyclical) of urbanisation. A notable theoretical advance was re-conceptualising 
‘peasant’ farmers as ‘petty commodity producers’, concentrating the contradictory 
relations of capital and labour in particular households, enterprises and even persons. 
 
More recently, Bernstein (2010, 110) has argued that the ‘classic’ Agrarian Question has been 
‘resolved’ on the global stage (even, and importantly, while remaining ‘unresolved’ in 
particular national contexts) and is increasingly being supplanted by a gathering general 
crisis of reproduction for ‘fragmented classes of labour’. A key component of this ‘Agrarian 
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Question of Labour’ is the growing number of rural households in the Global South, whose 
survival depends on the (direct and indirect) sale of their labour power, but who face 
mounting, complex and contradictory pressures on their social reproduction. 
 
At the same time, a developing wider literature is placing renewed focus on transcending the 
dualism between ‘accumulation’ and ‘social reproduction’, as well as problematic analytical 
distinctions between ‘public’/‘private’ and ‘commodified’/‘non-commodified’ domains. This 
literature interrogates not only the inter-relation of accumulation and social reproduction (of 
both society at large and of particular classes) but their mutual constitution (Bhattacharya 
2017; Ferguson et al. 2016). This is a fruitful area of engagement for Marxist approaches to rural 
class dynamics in the Global South in general, and Africa in particular, where tensions between 
accumulation and social reproduction, and their role in localised forms of politics, have long 
been noted (Bernstein 2010; Gibbon and Neocosmos 1985; O’Laughlin 1996). 
 
This contribution discusses material from two cases in rural South Africa, and shows how 
land plays an enduring, albeit shifting, role in social reproduction, class differentiation and 
stratification amidst a wider and deepening ‘fragmentation’ of class realities. The cases 
illustrate how the contradictions of daily and generational reproduction are both reflected 
in, and act as vectors of change of, local social organisation and cultural norms. 
 
It begins with a brief review of the recent literature on social reproduction in general, and 
observes that reproduction dynamics in rural economies of the Global South are 
distinguished by distinctive agricultural and natural resource-based livelihoods and 
property relations. The latter are often embedded within institutions that derive their 
legitimacy from ‘custom’ and other cultural forms as much as from state recognition.  
Cultural norms are often in tension with class relations, but are also fundamentally 
conditioned by how the latter condition and shape social reproduction. 
 
To provide context for the in-depth case study material presented, the paper briefly 
summarises key aspects of the historical development of South Africa’s racially inflected 
form of capitalist economy, in which self-provisioning through small-scale farming for 
domestic consumption and sale underpinned a system of cheap, migrant labour. It then 
describes the broad pressures on the social reproduction of ‘classes of labour’ in 
contemporary South Africa – both one of the world’s most unequal societies and one 
characterised by extreme unemployment, including nearly 40 percent of working-age 
adults. Poverty is deepest in rural areas, where one third of the population resides. 
Farming is a significant source of income for only a minority of rural residents, most of 
whom rely heavily on social grants provided by the government. 
 
The paper analyses the realities of social reproduction in two cases – in the Msinga 
communal area and in land reform projects in Besters, both located in rural KwaZulu-
Natal. It argues that household strategies for securing social reproduction are shaped by 
processes of class differentiation more broadly as well as locally. The contradictions of 




of gender and generation, but underpinned by class, that are expressed in local politics. It 
is suggested that similar dynamics may be at work across the Global South. 
 
Theorising social reproduction 
According to Marx, the capitalist production process ‘produces and reproduces the capital- 
relation itself: on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage-labourer’ (1976, 724). 
From the side of labour, wages are converted into 
 
means of subsistence which have to be consumed to reproduce the muscles, nerves, bones 
and brains of existing workers, and to bring forth new workers into existence … . The 
maintenance and reproduction of the working class remains a necessary condition for the 
reproduction of capital. But the capitalist may safely leave this to the worker’s drives for 
self-preservation and propagation. (Marx 1976, 717–78) 
 
From the vantage of capital, then, how workers reproduce themselves outside the ‘cost’ of 
their wages is their own business. At this level of abstraction, Marx largely assumed the 
cost of labour power to be equivalent to the wages required to cover the purchase of 
commodities necessary to workers’ social reproduction. This allowed Marx to examine 
key dynamics of capitalist societies, such as how lowering the cost of ‘necessary’ 
commodities enhances profits through ‘relative’ surplus appropriation. However, this 
assumption also left important lacunae in relation  to the determination of workers’ 
needs in relations and processes outside of wage relations. Here Marx is 
uncharacteristically vague, for example in noting the ‘production of labour power consists 
in his reproduction of himself or his maintenance’ (Marx 1976, 274), and … ‘the number 
and extent of his so-called necessary requirements, as also the manner in which they are 
satisfied, are themselves the product of history’ … . and  thus ‘the determination of the 
value  of labour power contains a historical and moral element’ (Marx 1976, 275). 
 
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, Marxist and feminist scholars began to place renewed 
emphasis on understanding social reproduction.  They  generated  fierce debates on the 
role of domestic labour,  and  the  incorporation and  transformation  of own production 
under colonial and imperial regimes (Meillassoux 1972). Analyses focused attention on 
how the reproduction of capital depends upon the social reproduction of labour through a 
wide range of ‘non-commodified’ forms of production and ‘non-economic’ relations. 
Although wages remain key for the purchase of commodities, the social reproduction of 
labour was also seen to involve, and rely on, institutions such as marriage, households 
and the state, and their governance of largely feminised unpaid labour, often under 
oppressive conditions. 
 
Social reproduction is core to a wide range of current debates, extending beyond the 
household and its gendered power relations to encompass all the institutions and 
processes through which labour power is renewed (Ferguson et al. 2016, 31; Katz 2001). 
Indeed, the scope of ‘social reproduction’ is potentially, and even bewilderingly, vast. 




relations, processes, structures, powers and conflicts’. For Laslett and Brenner (1989, 382), 
social reproduction refers to: 
 
the activities and attitudes, behaviours and emotions directly involved in the maintenance 
of life on a daily basis and intergenerationally … (it includes) how food, clothing and shelter 
are made available for immediate consumption, the ways in which the care and 
socialization of children are provided, the care of the infirm and the elderly, and the social 
organization of sexuality. 
 
Increasingly, Marxist-feminists see social reproduction not as a separate and autonomous, 
non-commoditised domain or social sphere, but as an integral feature of capitalist society 
that is deeply shaped and conditioned by the wider  dynamics  of  capital– labour  relations,  
changing  regimes  of  accumulation,  and  their  politics.  Katz  (2001, 711),  for  example,  
defines  social  reproduction  as  a  ‘set  of  structured  practices  that unfold in dialectical 
relation with production, with which it is mutually constitutive and in tension’. She adds 
that ‘the material social practices associated with its production [are] historically and 
geographically specific’, and ‘call  forth  a  range  of  cultural  forms and practices’ (Katz 
2001, 17). In  dialectical  fashion,  ‘patterns  of  social  reproduction are shaped by and also 
shape socio-economic and political  orders’ (Bakker and Silvey 2008, 3). As Bhattacharya 
(2017, 59) asserts, social reproduction is not about ‘two separate spaces and two separate 
processes of production, the economic  and the  social  – often understood as the 
workplace and home’. It focuses on capitalism as a complex totality or connected whole, 
in which ‘the economic impulse of capitalist production conditions the so-called 
noneconomic’, while not determining it. 
 
Some Marxist-feminists such as Picchio (1992) emphasise that capitalism both requires a 
sphere  of non-commoditised social reproduction and tends  to erode or destroy the 
relations that constitute it. Vogel (1983) asserts that there is a systematic (i.e. necessary 
and contradictory) relation between the production of labour power and the production of 
value or capital. Fraser (2016) argues that capitalism depends on several background 
conditions that it also tends to bring into crisis. Capitalism’s ‘drive to unlimited 
accumulation threatens to destabilize the very  reproductive  processes  that  capital  – and  
the rest of us – need’ (Fraser 2016, 103). If social reproduction is threatened, over time 
the effect will be that ‘capitalism’s accumulation dynamic effectively eats its own tail’ 
(Fraser 2016, 103). 
 
However, it is also apparent that in periods of accumulation characterised by rapid 
growth and rising wages, as occurred in developed capitalist countries in  the  post-World 
War II ‘golden age’ from the mid-1940s to the early 1970s, accumulation and enhanced 
living standards (i.e. social reproduction) were mutually supportive to some degree. In 
this period accumulation tended to be based on the appropriation of relative rather than 
absolute surplus value, and expanded markets for consumption goods and services 
facilitated accumulation. State-funded education and health services were provided on a 




or improved through political struggle ‘from below’ or reforms ‘from above’, public 
services represent one key area ‘outside’ direct wage-relations that not only improved 
living standards, but both relied on and conditioned wider commodity relations. 
 
In this period, the mutual conditioning of accumulation and social reproduction was 
partial and uneven, and marked by class, gender, race and other social differences, as 
well as by location within global capitalism’s uneven geography. Notions of a  ‘family wage’, 
for instance, reproduced heteronormative households  under  male  authority and 
involving robust gender differences (Fraser 2016, 111). Today, in an era of financialised 
capitalism underpinned by neoliberal policies, the contradictions between accumulation 
and social reproduction have deepened (Fine and Saad-Filho 2016, 162–68). They have 
been exacerbated in the current period of stagnation initiated by the global financial crisis 
of 2007/2008, as well as by the austerity policies of many governments. As Bakker and 
Silvey (2008, 4) emphasise, global neoliberal restructuring has seen ‘increasing tensions, 
contradictions and crises emerging within the domain of social reproduction’, in part 
through its increasing privatisation, marketisation and informalisation. These general 
tendencies are pervasive, but  have distinctive  features  in agrarian economies in the 
Global South. 
 
Social reproduction in agrarian economies in the Global South 
Social reproduction takes place in particular ways in economies in the Global South where 
small-scale agriculture is engaged in by significant numbers of people. It includes the use 
of crop and livestock production for domestic consumption and cash earnings, and the 
gathering of natural resources such as wild foods, fuelwood, timber, and materials for 
craft production, for both own use and sale. Many natural resources are found on the 
commons. All of these activities are structured by unequal and gendered  divisions  of labour 
and power relations, and women assume major roles in the so-called ‘subsistence 
economy’, which includes small-scale production, fuel and water collection, domestic labour 
and the care of young children, the frail elderly and the sick (Razavi 2009, 206). 
 
Production and reproduction in both non-commodified relations and in markets are as 
dynamically intertwined in agrarian societies  as  in  developed  capitalist  economies, but in 
distinctive ways (Chung 2017). Access to and control over land and natural resources, in 
conjunction with the labour required for production and gathering, emerge as key to the 
sphere of social reproduction in agrarian economies (Naidu and Ossome 2016, 61). Given 
the generalised commodification of contemporary life under capitalism, cash income is 
required for many items of subsistence. Employment for wages, in cash or in kind, locally 
or farther afield, is usually necessary, and both types of employment and levels of 
remuneration  are  gendered  and  unequal.  Employment can both constrain own 
production (e.g. by drawing away labour; or providing an exit from the rural economy) 





Pressures on social reproduction arise from the unequal character of class relations 
under capitalism, and are key to class differentiation in agrarian economies.1 As Bernstein 
(2010, 103) argues, drawing from Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985), small-scale farmers 
should be conceived as ‘petty commodity producers’ rather than ‘peasants’ (often 
portrayed as existing outside of capitalism’s class dynamics and contradictions).2 Petty 
agricultural commodity producers combine the class places of capital and labour within 
their enterprises: they possess means of production, unlike landless workers, and are in 
this sense, capitalists, but they also use their own labour (unlike capitalists, who hire in 
workers). Often sexual divisions of labour  within  farm  households  see  men occupying the 
effective position of capital (by directing the production process and appropriating 
proceeds) and exploiting women and children engaging in both productive labour and 
social reproductive activities. As Bernstein (1986, 22) puts it: 
 
In terms of the enterprise as a whole, and its fortunes (reproduction, decomposition, 
transformation), its distinctive combination of class places can help  explain  the  
contradictions petty commodity producers often confront between reproducing themselves 
as labour (daily and generational reproduction) and capital (maintenance, replacement, 
and possibly expansion of the means of production). 
 
By combining the positions of capital and labour, petty commodity producers consequently  
also  concentrate  contradictory  imperatives  to  secure  both  social  reproduction and 
valorisation. Bernstein (2010, 18–20) proposes that this is expressed in meeting the 
demands of four competing ‘funds’:  a consumption fund for food, clothing, shelter etc., 
including for those too young or unfit to work; a replacement fund for productive capital 
(e.g. seed, tools, draught animals) – but also for labour, through generational reproduction 
in childbearing and raising, as well as care of the old and unfit; a ceremonial fund, for 
activities that ‘create and recreate the cultures and social relations of farming 
communities, such as rituals and festivities’ (Bernstein 2010, 20); and a fund of rent, 
where farmers make payments to others such as landlords, moneylenders or states. 
 
The notion of a ‘ceremonial fund’, first proposed by Wolf (1966), suggests that social 
reproduction in agrarian contexts should be  understood  as  involving  more  than  daily and 
generational reproduction, and more than the reproduction of the capital–labour relation, 
or other kinds of class relations. It involves reproduction of the social, i.e. of social 
relations more broadly. Moreover, the manner and degree to which the demands of the 
ceremonial fund are met under the conditions imposed by capitalist value relations 
contributes to the structuring of wider social institutions and relations, without necessarily 
determining their particular form. 
 
                                                          
1 The degree to which this tendency is evident in practice is highly contingent, and does not necessarily manifest in clear trends 
(Bernstein 2010, 109). 
2 This view has been widely adopted, for example by scholars of rural India such as Harriss-White (2012) and Lerche (2013), and by 




This reading of the ‘ceremonial fund’ is consonant with Bhattacharya’s (2017) 
characterisation of the efforts in social reproduction theory to transcend a dualistic 
conceptualisation of class and social reproduction. The question is not simply one of  
seeking  to identify social institutions that ‘pre-date’ class in order to analyse how they 
‘mediate’ class (Mezzadri 2016, 1880), nor to uncover how accumulation in a ‘public’ sphere 
of ‘commodified’ relations is founded upon a prior binary antagonism of accumulation with 
‘private’ and ‘non-commodified’ relations. Rather, it is of one of how the actual conditions of 
labour power’s reproduction (in an expansive sense that includes institutions, activities and 
antagonisms outside of employment) is continually being re-shaped and re-invented by its 
relation to capital accumulation in a dynamic and structured, but non-determinate 
manner. 
 
Given the particular importance in the Global South of land and natural resources, and 
thus property rights, a key aspect of social reproduction is how access to and control over 
these resources are structured and governed. This involves socially and culturally defined 
identities and relations, and finds ideological expression in notions of ‘community’ and 
‘tradition’. ‘The social’ thus has to include questions of kinship, family, marriage and the 
constitution of households; community membership, the ‘cultural’ sphere and the ceremonial 
economy; and property rights. 
 
These kinds of social institutions and their relation to land are certainly historical in 
character, but they cannot be seen simply as ‘independent’ variables conditioning 
accumulation. One striking  illustration of this is provided  by  Capps’ (2016) analysis of 
the emergence and subsequent evolution of the BaFokeng chieftaincy as  a  form  of ‘tribal 
landed property’. As an unintended consequence of state nationalisation of mineral rights, 
the Bafokeg ruling elite has shifted from being ‘rentiers’ amassing royalties under a tribal-
trust regime, in tension with mining capital, to becoming direct shareholders in such capital, 
with diversified financial interests. 
 
The matter is, moreover, not simply one of transformations from ‘above’. Ferguson 
(2013) discusses the centrality of land for the rural poor  in  contemporary  Southern Africa 
within ‘distributive relations’. These involve not only land-based production, but also  
accessing  a  ‘rightful  share’ of  cash  and  other  forms  of  support  deriving  from 
membership or ownership-based claims on citizenship, indigeneity or ethnicity.3  Land is 
now being used to reinvent circuits of distribution in economies where both circular migrant 
labour is eroding and large-scale commercial agriculture renders small-scale farming 
uncompetitive, and where other sources of income, such as welfare grants, are being 
distributed through new sets of social relations (Ferguson 2013,  171).  ‘Land’ (often as 
‘place’ rather than as productive resource) can anchor such relations, e.g. as somewhere 
to properly bury the dead, provide a place of connection and return for kin, establish 
continuity with the past, underpin the powers of traditional authorities, and symbolise 
                                                          




collective identity and belonging (Ferguson 2013, 168). In this view, land is a vital 
component of social reproduction even when its productive use is marginal or absent. 
 
Fragmentation of classes of labour and the crisis of social reproduction 
Bernstein (2010) locates the reproduction squeeze facing small farmers today within the 
global reality of the increasing (structural) fragmentation of ‘classes of  labour’,4  by which 
he means a set of people depending, directly and indirectly, on the sale of their labour 
power for their daily reproduction: 
 
The working poor of the South have to pursue their reproduction through insecure, 
oppressive and typically increasingly scarce wage employment and/or a range of likewise 
precarious small-scale and insecure ‘informal economy’ survival activity, including 
marginal farming. In effect, livelihoods are pursued through complex combinations of 
employment and self-employment (Bernstein 2010, 111). 
 
‘Fragmentation’ refers in part to hybrid and diverse combinations of precarious forms of 
livelihood and sources of income available to classes of labour in global capitalism today, 
as well as the ‘forms of differentiation and oppression along intersecting lines of class, 
gender, generation, caste and ethnicity’ (Bernstein 2006, 455). The politics of the poor are 
often equally fragmented. 
 
In an illuminating analysis of the agrarian question in Mozambique, O’Laughlin (1996) 
shows how two different but inter-related processes of class formation occurred in the 
countryside in the colonial period: (1) diversification of rural livelihoods, and (2) class 
stratification. The former reflects changes in the way that people organised their work 
and reproduction as commoditisation proceeded; the latter refers to the processes 
through which sharp differences emerged between households in relation to control of the 
means of production. Gendered divisions of labour in both production and reproduction 
are key to both processes. Diversification and stratification can proceed together as wage 
labour and market relations expand over time, but their rhythms may be very different, 
especially in contexts where indigenous capital was suppressed. The notion of 
‘fragmentation’ resonates strongly with this analysis. In her view, the imperatives of 
securing the social reproduction of the rural population, as well as the variety of ways in 
which this was shaped by the dynamics of rural class formation in the colonial era, are 
central features of the agrarian question. 
 
In her 1996 paper O’Laughlin rarely uses the term ‘reproduction’, and instead refers to 
‘everyday subsistence’, ‘basic needs’ or ‘livelihoods’. However, it is clear that these terms 
refer to the same substantive realities of social reproduction discussed by other Marxist- 
feminists. Similarly, Stevano (2017) for example has demonstrated the gendered character 
of ‘fragmentation’ in cycles of food insecurity in northern Mozambique. Here the seasonal 
                                                          
4 The term ‘classes of labour’ is preferred by Bernstein to the older vocabulary of ‘proletariat’ and ‘semi-proletariat’ because the latter 
are often encumbered by problematic assumptions, such as functionalist readings of Marx’s notion of the ‘reserve army of labour’. For 




character of agricultural work, together with reliance on multiple and precarious incomes, 
impinges on domestic activities typically performed by women, and undermines the regular 
and diverse diet of households. O’Laughlin’s recent work on the ‘production of affliction’ 
amongst rural populations of Southern Africa further shows how their health status, and 
thus biological reproduction, continues to be negatively affected by the ‘structural 
contradictions’ and dynamics of the labour-reserve  systems that emerged in the course 
of capitalist development in the region (O’Laughlin 2013, 194; see also O’Laughlin 2017). 
 
Capitalist development in South Africa 
We now turn to the case of South Africa. A sketch of the history of capitalist development in 
South Africa provides some context for the discussion of contemporary dynamics. The 
development of capitalist agriculture in South Africa did not promote industrialisation, as 
might have occurred elsewhere (Byres 1996); rather, the reverse was true. Industrialisation 
in South Africa was initiated in the final three decades of the nineteenth century following 
the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886, prompting an aggressive colonial 
expansion to underpin significant levels of foreign investment. Previously, the commercial 
economy was largely concentrated around the ports of the Cape and Natal, while the 
interior was largely agrarian in character, supporting a small population of indigenous 
peoples and an even smaller group of European settlers exercising political power. The 
arrival of mining and its ancillary industries not only tightened links to world competition 
and trade (comprised mainly of exported minerals and imports of other goods) but under- 
pinned tendencies to urbanisation. 
 
The social reproduction of African labour played an early and calculated role in shaping 
these processes. Both mining and an emergent (white) capitalist agriculture were 
dependent on a low-wage regime for their growth. State policies of racial segregation, 
movement and widespread African land dispossession (including of increasingly market- 
orientated producers) provided extensive land resources to white landed property, and a 
general supply of African labour ‘cheapened’ by their partial survival through own 
production in the reserves and as labour-tenants on white farms. African social 
reproduction was reconfigured as spatially dispersed combinations of wages and own 
production, mediated by highly gendered divisions of labour and lineal networks, which 
continue to resonate today (Bernstein 1996; Innes 1984; Wolpe 1972). 
 
Whereas previously the reserve system had been geared to coercing a supply of ‘cheap’ 
unskilled African labour, under apartheid it was increasingly orientated to housing an 
African population ‘surplus’ to capital’s requirements. For Wolpe (1972), the final erosion of 
the ‘subsidy’ provided by African subsistence in over-populated reserves was demonstrated 
by the apartheid state’s attempt to recast the reserves as nominally independent 
‘homelands’. It also involved dispossession and resettlement of large numbers of black 
South Africans, with Platzky and Walker (1985) estimating that 3.5 million Africans were 






Arrighi, Aschoff, and Scully (2010) argue that the unintended wider consequences of 
these policies were negative for South African  capitalism:  a  narrow  domestic  market was 
impeded by stagnant black wages; small-scale agriculture in the reserves largely collapsed, 
and, together with the racially exclusive character of social welfare, limited the potential 
for import-substituting growth in the manufacturing sector. By the 1980s, the 
contradictions of apartheid South Africa’s particular path of capitalist development had 
become increasingly fierce.5 As shown below, these contradictions have not been resolved in 
the post-apartheid era, not least in relation to the social reproduction of the rural 
population. 
 
Fragmented classes of labour and social reproduction in post-apartheid South Africa  
Policies and outcomes 
Since 1994, state policies in South Africa have combined conservative economic policies 
with a range of programmes of social provision designed to ameliorate poverty and 
inequality. The structure of the economy carries key continuities with the past  (e.g. capital 
in most sectors remains highly concentrated; Bosiu et al. 2017, 30), but significant changes 
are evident (Seekings and Nattrass 2015). The contributions of key sectors such as mining, 
manufacturing and agriculture to gross domestic product (GDP) and employment have 
declined over the past two decades, being supplanted by  an  expanding  service sector 
(especially ‘business’ and ‘financial services’) and government spending. The economy has 
increasingly internationalised, both ‘inwardly’ (as more foreign companies operate in 
South Africa) and ‘outwardly’ (as South African companies shift parts of their operations 
to other countries, including through cross-listing in different stock exchanges, in a process 
of ‘capital flight’). Levels of investment in the productive economy by leading firms are low 
(Bhorat et al. 2014). 
 
Most corrosively, South African capitalism is unable to provide employment to large 
numbers of people. Unemployment is very high: currently standing at around 27 percent 
if only active job seekers are counted, and 37 percent if those too discouraged to seek 
work are included (Stats SA 2017a). Many of those  employed,  particularly  in casual or 
temporary work, earn very low wages – these are the  ‘working  poor’. Young South 
Africans are particularly badly affected: in 2017, nearly  a  third  of  all those between  ages 
15  and 24 were not in employment, education  or training  (Stats SA 2017b). 
 
Over half of South Africans experience poverty, and income inequality remains amongst 
the highest in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.68. Inter-racial inequality has 
declined somewhat, but intra-racial inequality is increasing as class differences surpass 
those of  race (Seekings and  Nattrass  2015, 51–53).  Without the  massive programme of 17 
million social grants (benefitting around one third of a population of 55 million) with a 
value of around 3.5 percent of GDP, poverty and inequality would be even deeper. Social 
                                                          
5 The character of apartheid South Africa’s contradictions is more complicated and nuanced than sketched here, and there are important 
differences in views amongst scholars, including those cited above and Burawoy (1976), Fine and Rustomjee (1996), Gelb (1991), Hart 




protection now constitutes around 16 percent of the national budget, with education 
comprising 20 percent and health services 12 percent. 
 
Whether this hybrid of conservative economic policies and social welfare can be sustained 
for much longer is in doubt. Economic growth has slowed in recent years, and is currently 
less than one percent per annum. There is clear evidence that many parastatals and state-
owned enterprises have been ‘captured’ by a corrupt group within the ruling party, who 
provide rent-seeking opportunities for a small number of black and foreign capitalists 
(Bhorat et al. 2017). Currently, there is a generalised sense of social and political crisis. For 
the poorest half of the population, a key element of this crisis is pressure on their social 
reproduction. 
 
Poverty, inequality and social reproduction 
Over half of the South African population experiences income poverty, according to a 
recent report from government (Stats SA 2017a; see Table 1). Three poverty lines are 
shown; the lowest, the food poverty line (FPL), refers to ‘individuals unable to purchase or 
consume enough food to meet minimum per-capita-per-day energy requirements for 
adequate health’ (14). The other two, a ‘lower bound’ poverty line (LBPL) and an ‘upper 
bound’ poverty line (UBPL), include some non-food components, but the LBPL requires 
individuals sacrifice some food to obtain these, while at the UBPL, adequate food and 
non-food items can be purchased. These data show that poverty declined from 2006 to 
2011, in line with the general trend for most of the post-apartheid period, but has increased 
since. 
 
In relation to spatial location, poverty is deepest in rural areas, where the majority of the 
poor (53.5 percent) reside (68). In 2015, 81.3 percent of rural dwellers fell beneath the 
UBPL, 65.4 percent beneath the LBPL, and 45.6 percent below the FPL. Provinces with 
the highest poverty head counts were Limpopo, Eastern  Cape  and  KwaZulu-Natal (66), 
each with very  large  proportions  of  their  populations  in  communal  areas, the former 
‘native reserves’. In relation to the basics of social reproduction (food, shelter, energy, 
water, sanitation and  health),  80.5  percent  of  poor  households (defined by the UBPL) 
had access to electricity, 59 percent to piped water and  39.3 percent to flush toilets (101). 
Many were subsidised from municipal rates paid by wealthier households and from grants 
from central government (Seekings and Nattrass 2015, 186). Most of South Africa’s poor, 
including those in rural areas, purchase the bulk of their  food.  As  elsewhere,  the  
proportion  of  income  the  poor  spend  on  food  is  much higher than for the non-poor, at 






South Africa continues to experience high rates of HIV and AIDS. In 2016, the country 
had the largest number of HIV-positive people in the world (7.03 million, or 12.7 percent 
of the population), with particularly high prevalence  rates  for  adults  younger than 50 
(18.9 percent), and particularly women younger than 50 (22.3 percent) (Stats SA 2016, 7). 
The spread of the pandemic has been contained by programmes to address mother-to-
child transmission and provision of antiretroviral medications on a  large scale. However, 
for young females in particular, the disease remains a serious threat to their health. 
 
High rates of sexually transmitted disease in South Africa have long been associated with 
the migrant labour system that was integral to industrialisation (Andersson  and Marks 
1988). In the post-apartheid era, the HIV/AIDS pandemic can be partly explained by (or 
perhaps, following O’Laughlin (2017), produced by), rising  unemployment  and other 
forms of social inequality, and associated dramatic declines in the rate of marriage 
amongst the African population, and the increased geographic mobility  of women, as 
Hunter (2007) suggests. Many younger women are engaged in circular migration pivoted 
on a rural home, and in urban contexts often live in informal settlements. Here the rate 
of HIV/AIDS is twice as high as elsewhere, and residents are ‘typically young, unmarried 
and without secure work’ (Hunter 2007, 690). Often these young women transmit resources 
to their mothers, who care for their children at a rural home; thus, kinship ties are 
strengthened through the sexual economy, as well as the redistribution of income from 
social grants (Hunter 2007, 698). 
 
Hunter argues (Hunter 2007, 694, emphasis in original) that young generations of South 
Africans are experiencing a ‘simultaneous collapse of both agrarian and wage livelihoods, 
with very important consequences for marriage, household formation and sexuality’. 
Changes in marriage practices are a key component of the reconfiguration of social 
reproduction in the post-apartheid era. Posel and Rudwick (2013) analyse data from 
representative surveys which show that in 2010 only 41 percent of African women had ever 
been married, compared to 81 percent for white women. Around 73 percent of African 
women between the ages of 20 and 30 had never been married, and were not cohabiting 







South Africa’s fragmented classes of labour 
Many South Africans are experiencing severe pressure on their social reproduction, in part 
because of the ‘fragmentation’ of ‘classes of labour’. In the absence of recent Marxist analysis 
of class structure in South Africa as a whole, the Weberian approach of Seekings and 
Nattrass (2015, 118–22) is helpful for describing the contours of class-based inequality (if 
not the underlying dynamics and relations that produce these inequalities).6 They 
characterise the class structure of South Africa in 2008 in terms of three broad strata, 
each comprising several classes (see Table 2). There is an upper class,  including  the ‘upper  
middle  classes’ and  comprising  business,  professional  and  management,  and self-
employed people, constituting 17 percent of households and earning 55 percent of all 
income. Lower middle and working classes comprise semi-professionals, intermediate 
groups, petty traders and the core working class, and make up 46 percent of all house- 
holds earning 35 percent of all income. The working poor, underclass and others make 




Seekings and Nattrass comment that between 1993 and 2008, ‘the class structure … 
changed marginally whilst remaining fundamentally the same’ (118). The rich did 
particularly well in the early 2000s, and some of their gains were redistributed to the 
poor via taxes, social grants and so on. The core working class (comprising mostly less-
skilled workers in industry) shrank most, and less-skilled workers became increasingly 
restricted to informal and non-tradeable sectors. More than half of the lower classes were 
rural, and in the former reserves, 63 percent of the population was lower class (121). The 
lower classes include the working poor in domestic work and agriculture, hawkers and 
                                                          




others in ‘survivalist’ self-employment, workers in casual and other informal employment, 
and many of the unemployed (130). 
 
In our view, Bernstein’s concept of ‘fragmented classes of labour’, together with 
O’Laughlin’s emphasis on the importance of paired processes of livelihood diversification 
and class stratification, are key to understanding the contradictions of South African 
capitalism. This is true in relation to both historically determined conditions and 
contemporary patterns of reproduction and change, the key point being that formal 
employment by itself is not able to satisfy the social reproduction needs of the majority 
(despite being a crucial component of social reproduction). 
 
All of those designated as ‘lower class’ by Seekings and Nattrass can be characterised in 
this manner, as well as some in the middle stratum. This suggestion is consistent with 
Zizzamia et al.’s (2016) analysis, which distinguishes those who face an above-average 
risk of slipping into poverty – the vulnerable  – from  the  more  secure  ‘middle  class’, who 
have a below-average risk of entering poverty. In 2014/2015, the vulnerable constituted 18 
percent of the population, with the poor at 65 percent, the secure middle class at 13.5 
percent and the elite at 3.5 percent (29). In the absence of jobs, social grants and other  
forms  of  public  provision  are  crucial  for  the  social  reproduction  of  ‘classes  of labour’. 
 
Social reproduction and its contradictions in South Africa’s rural areas 
We turn now to our two in-depth case studies. One is located in South Africa’s ‘communal 
areas’, as the former native reserves are now known, home to one-third of the population 
(around 18 million people). The other is on farms redistributed through post-apartheid 
land reform and collectively owned by beneficiaries. Aspects of rural social reproduction in 
such contexts that are well described in the literature include: the absence of significant 
income earnings from small-scale agriculture for the majority of rural households; 
diversification of livelihood strategies; purchase rather than production of most food; 
dependence on social grants as the main source of cash income; and a high prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS (Neves and Toit 2013). 
 
Less commonly discussed, but also key to understanding  social  reproduction  in these 
contexts, are processes of social differentiation by class, gender and generation; the key 
role of livestock in both livelihoods and ceremonies; the continuing salience of ‘custom’ in 
social relations and identities, including processes of gaining access to land; the socially 
embedded character of property rights; gendered  and  generational  tensions  within  rural  
households  and  homesteads;  how  emerging   contradictions   in social life as ‘custom’ 
and ‘tradition’ are  simultaneously  asserted  and  undermined; and the general 
significance of the ceremonial economy.  Tensions  also  abound  in many areas in 
relation to the ‘customary’ powers of unelected chiefs in local-level governance, 
underpinned by their key roles in land allocation and administration (Capps and 
Mnwana 2015). Contestations around the chieftaincy are in part rooted in the 




resources continues to  be  critically  important  for  many  households  and  is  mediated by 
‘custom’.7  
 
These issues are explored in the cases, based on field research over several years by two of 
the authors. Research methods combined intensive and extensive approaches (Sayer 
2010), the former comprising direct observation, in-depth interviews, life histories and 
enterprise budgets, and the latter household surveys and enterprise budgets. 
 
Msinga district in kwazulu-Natal 
This case shows how social reproduction is inseparable from and deeply conditioned by 
the character of the capitalist economy, both nationally and in its local manifestations.88 
Land tenure in Msinga is ‘customary’ in character, but there are growing tensions around 
residential land as a result of declining rates of marriage, and associated shifts in how 
homesteads, the key locus of social reproduction, are established. Access to high-value 
irrigated plots for fresh produce is  also  governed  by  customary  tenure,  as well  as  a  
‘socially  embedded’ rental  market,  and  these  constrain  accumulation.  Local politics is 
often focused on competing ideas about ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’, in relation to land but also 
social institutions. 
 
In 2011 Msinga was rated as the municipality with the deepest poverty in KwaZulu- 
Natal province. It is located in  a  dry  to  semi-arid  zone  with  average  rainfall  of  500– 
600 mm per annum, but is densely populated. It has a long history of labour tenancy on 
neighbouring white farms, forced removals, labour migration to the Witwatersrand, and 
stock theft. In many ways, Msinga exemplifies the legacies of dispossession, the labour-
reserve system and the precariousness of social reproduction in rural  South Africa more 
generally. 
 
Dryland cropping in Msinga has been in decline for many years, but around 1500 
households (of a total of 38,000 households in the area) grow  vegetables  and  green maize, 
for sale on two irrigation schemes. This scarce irrigation land is in high demand. The 
ownership of livestock is unequal, but cattle (held by around 40 percent of house-holds), 
goats (69 percent) and indigenous poultry (91 percent) remain important for consumption, 
marriage feasts, and funerals and other ceremonies, as well as occasional sales. There is an 
active local market in goats required for ritual slaughters – more so than in relation to 
cattle. Access to land is crucial for establishing a homestead, as well as for cropping and the 
grazing of livestock on the commons. 
 
Detailed research on the largest irrigation scheme in Msinga, located at Tugela Ferry, 
reveals irrigated plots were the main site of household food production (i.e. ‘subsistence’) by 
local residents until the early 1980s, when traders with pick-up trucks arrived. The 
traders offered to purchase truckloads of fresh produce for retail farther afield, and led 
                                                          
7 The politics of the chieftaincy in contemporary South Africa is complex, and space does not allow further discussion here. See Capps 
(this issue) for in-depth analysis from a Marxist perspective. 




plot holders to focus on production for sale. The main crops grown are green maize, 
tomatoes, sweet potatoes, cabbages, spinach and other green leafy vegetables. Individual 
plots range from 0.08 to 0.2 hectares in size, with a mean of around 0.1 hectares. Many 
farmers borrow or informally rent in uncultivated plots held by others, and the mean 
number of plots cultivated is 4.3 (around 0.4 ha). A few famers plant lucrative but illegal 
plots of marijuana along the canals and next to the Thukela River. It is possible to cultivate 
three crops a year on a single plot, and almost all farmers plant green maize. They produce 
some of the earliest maize in the province, with cobs sold as far afield as the main cities in 
the province. Many crops are purchased at the farm gate by traders. Some farmers transport 
their crops to nearer small towns for direct sale to hawkers or consumers. Over 70 percent 
of crops planted are profitable, but the estimated net profit per farmer per annum is 
modest, averaging R6700, or R558 per month in 2011, around 50 percent of the state old 
age pension.9  
 
The great majority of irrigation plot farmers (88 percent) are women, who work on their 
plots on most days, as well as undertaking domestic labour in their homesteads. The 
distribution of plots is not very uneven, with only 11 percent of farmers cultivating over 6 
plots, and  very few  more  than 10  plots.  There  are few  dramatic  differences  between 
smaller and larger cultivators, with the latter having slightly higher numbers of household 
members in permanent jobs or earning income from farming. Some clear differences do 
exist in relation to agriculture, with larger cultivators owning more agricultural assets and 
larger numbers of livestock than smaller cultivators. They also employ more local people in 
specific piece-work tasks such as weeding, watering or harvesting of crops. Many temporary 
workers are drawn from households without plots, and wages are paid in cash or in kind. 
Survey data suggest that households without plots tend to own fewer assets than those   
with   plots,   own   fewer   livestock,   and   have   fewer   members   in   permanent 
employment. 
 
Accumulation in small-scale agriculture is not entirely absent in Msinga, but it is highly 
constrained. Most income earned from crops or livestock sales is used to support social 
reproduction, including purchases of food. None of the larger cultivators on the irrigation 
schemes relies solely on agriculture, and permanent jobs are an important source of income 
in these households. In addition, all receive at least one social grant, either a pension or 
a child support grant. Irrigated agriculture for the market is seen by most farmers as a  
valuable income supplement to formal or informal employment, or  self-employment, or 
received in social grants. Greatly expanded access to irrigated plots by would-be 
accumulators would constitute a threat to the key role of fresh produce income in the 
social reproduction strategies of the majority of plot holders. The only partially 
commoditised informal land rental market provides limited opportunities for expansion, 
and is hence a key constraint on accumulation. 
 
                                                          




More widely, virtually all Msinga households depend heavily on social grants, but given 
their low cash value many men and younger women are often absent, seeking wage 
employment. The great majority of the population of Msinga lives in poverty. Government 
jobs for teachers, nurses and administrators are available for only a better educated 
minority, who constitute a local elite. Some also cultivate irrigated plots, own larger herds 
of livestock and operate small businesses (e.g. small shops or taxi services). 
 
In Msinga, as in communal areas in general, access to land is central to establishing and 
socially reproducing households. The land tenure system in Msinga is ‘customary’ in 
character, and includes common pool resources for grazing and natural resources. Chiefs 
provide an oversight role, but most land administration occurs  at  the  neighbourhood level. 
Families are allocated residential plots for the establishment of a homestead, but arable 
land  is limited and many households no longer cultivate dryland  crops  – even when they 
do hold fields. Many households, however, cultivate a small garden to supplement their 
food supply. 
 
Residents of Msinga articulate a ‘normative ideal’ of how land should be allocated, used and 
administered, which involves a distinctive set of organising principles. Rights and 
obligations are defined through membership of families, households, kinship groups, 
neighbourhoods and ‘tribal communities’. The key principle is that married people with 
children should be allocated land on which to establish a homestead and gain access to 
natural resources to support their families. Land is allocated to a household, under the 
authority of the household head, understood to be a senior male. 
 
The extended family remains the basic unit of social organisation. Marriage establishes 
relationships between two descent groups, effected by payments of bridewealth (ilobolo) 
that transfer the rights to women’s reproductive capacity to her husband’s family. Descent is 
patrilineal, and a central concern for families is preserving the identity of the male 
lineage and its connection to past generations, symbolised in the family surname. 
Marriage is virilocal and children belong to the husband’s family. Together  with  gender, 
family membership is a key determinant of social identity; it forms the basis of a web of 
relationships, rights and obligations. 
 
The contradictions of social reproduction in communal areas are evident in discrepancies 
between these normative ideals of social organisation, derived from the structure of social 
relations in the precolonial era, and current practices. Marriage is in decline, partly as a 
result of the growing difficulties experienced by young men in their attempts to find 
wage employment, and partly due to reduced levels of control of the labour of women, 
now the main recipients of government social grants. Survey data reveal that 56 percent 
of adults have never been married, and that only six percent had entered into a full 
traditional marriage. 
 
Increasing numbers of unmarried women with children are now requesting land to be 




Particularly notable is: (1) increasing numbers of women live within their father’s (or 
brother’s) homesteads, bearing and raising children outside of a stable, co-residential 
relationship; and (2) increasing numbers of co-habiting couples only ‘partially marry’, 
alongside a growing prioritisation of registration of marriage over the completion of 
marital rituals and practices prescribed by custom. There is also a significant increase in 
numbers of female relatives accommodated within homesteads, but outside of the 
patrilineal system. These include unmarried, divorced or  separated  daughters,  and  sisters,  
aunts and great-aunts on either the husband’s or the wife’s side, together with their 
descendants. Because these women’s surnames may differ from the ‘household surname’, 
they are not viewed as full-fledged family members. 
 
A new form of marriage, known as uganile, has emerged. This involves pregnant women 
moving to reside at their husband’s homes after ‘damages’ have been paid. Many of these 
women opt to register such marriages at the magistrate’s office, since this enables them to 
claim pension or life insurance payouts to which their husbands contributed in periods of 
formal employment. The distinction between ‘married’ and ‘unmarried’ women is not 
always clear cut, as the payment of cattle as damages to the female partner’s family 
blurs distinctions between an iqhikiza (an unmarried woman in  a  relationship  with  a 
man, possibly with a child) and an umakoti (a young wife). 
 
Discrepancies between cultural norms and actual practices underpin tensions in Msinga 
within and between families, often expressed along gendered and generational lines. In 
some areas, an unmarried woman requesting land must have sons (who carry the surname 
of the lineage) before she can be allocated land, but in other areas women with 
daughters can be allocated land. One of the traditional councils10 in the Msinga 
municipality, that of the Mthembu, is strongly opposed to the allocation of land to 
unmarried women with children. Fearing violence as a result of ‘boyfriends’ visiting such 
women, the council instead encourages site allocation within the boundaries of the umuzi 
for single mothers to build a home. In contrast, the neighbouring Mchunu Traditional 
Council decided in 2009 that land to establish a homestead could be allocated to  any  single 
person, male or female, genuinely in need. The council qualified this right by requiring 
that residents in the neighbourhood provide approval, and that traditional leaders oversee 
the process. 
 
By 2015, allocations of land to single people were occurring on a significant scale in both 
the Mthembu and Mchunu areas, but ‘custom’ continued to be a site of tension and 
contestation, within and between households and families, as well as within ‘tribal’ 
politics. Factional violence within and between different residential units continues to erupt 
periodically. Other common axes of conflict are gender and generation, as ‘custom’ and 
‘tradition’ are simultaneously asserted and adapted by women and men, and younger and 
older people. 
                                                          
10 Traditional councils began to be established in all communal areas following approval of the Traditional Leadership and Governance 






Land reform farms in Besters, KwaZulu-Natal 
This case is not located in a communal area, but describes aspects of accumulation and 
social reproduction on collectively owned farms in the Besters district acquired through 
the post-Apartheid government’s land redistribution programme.11 Land reform 
beneficiaries engage in commercial beef production, mostly from collectively owned cattle 
herds, but combined, in complex and variable ways, with multiple-function livestock herds 
owned by individual households. Customary norms and values inform social organisation, 
property holding and production, in a manner that is similar to, but also subtly different 
from, communal areas. The case illustrates the significance of the livestock and the 
ceremonial ‘fund’ for social reproduction, but their interactions with wage income and 
commodity production are key to complex and differentiated  social  dynamics.  Tensions 
over the distribution and uses of cash income generated by collectively  owned  cattle herds 
in particular generate a local politics centred on the contradictions between accumulation 
and social reproduction. 
 
The Besters Land Reform Project is located in the north-west of KwaZulu-Natal province, in 
an agro-ecological zone suited to cattle farming. From 2005, negotiations were initiated 
between commercial farm owners and labour  tenants to resolve tenants’ land claims. 
These led to the transfer of approximately 21 percent of privately owned farmland in the 
district to groups of labour tenant  households  and  other  farmworkers.  A  total  of 178 
households benefitted from transfers of land, cattle and agricultural implements, at a total 
cost of around R25 million. Thirteen communal  property  associations  (CPAs) were 
established to take ownership of the farms, ranging from three to 28 member households per 
CPA, and managed on behalf of members by elected committees. By 2006, white landowners 
had been paid market prices for the land, and beneficiaries were beginning to sell weaned 
oxen in local auction sales and informal markets – a rare land reform ‘success story’.12  
 
Research on six of the 13 farms revealed that in 2010 beneficiary households owned a 
total of 1813 cattle, with a mean household herd size of 22 and a range of zero to 154 
cattle.13 Four of the six CPAs owned cattle in their own right, and operated commercial 
beef production enterprises on some parts of the  farm,  while the  other  two CPAs had 
reallocated all of their  cattle  to  member  households.  The  total  stock  of CPA cattle in 
2010 amounted to 529 head, with a mean herd size of 132,  ranging between 15 and 278 
head. Cattle production on these farms is organised at both household  and  CPA  levels,  
with  CPA  herds  sometimes  kept  in  separate  paddocks. 
 
CPA beef herds often provide cross-subsidies, in kind, cash or breeding stock, to house-
hold  herds. 
 
                                                          
11 This case is based on Hornby (2015). 
12 Initially the beneficiaries also engaged in maize and soya production, but cropping has declined both on these land reform farms and 
on commercial farms across the district more generally. Homesteads often include gardens for vegetable production, however. 
13 These household herd sizes are markedly higher than in most communal area contexts; e.g. in Msinga in 2014 the mean herd size for 




Farming is only one of a number of livelihood strategies that beneficiaries pursue. A 
survey in 2010 revealed fewer people secured incomes from farming (21 percent) than 
from employment (54 percent) and social grants (38 percent), and around five percent 
derived cash income from CPA dividends or employment. However, the distribution of 
income from these multiple sources was uneven.14 Of the 60 households earning  an income 
from employment, the top quartile received 54 percent of the total income and the bottom 
quartile only 7.5 percent. The distribution of household farming was even more skewed, 
with the top quartile receiving 71 percent of total farming income, while the bottom 
quartile received just three percent. 
 
Households in the wealthiest asset group, which own nearly double the number of assets 
owned by the population as a whole, also own more than half the total number of cattle, 
have a greater number of income sources, and are least likely to be headed by women. 
More than two-thirds (70 percent) of female-headed households are found in the two 
poorer asset quartiles. The unequal wealth structure thus reflects both livelihood 
diversification and differential capacities to engage in farm production, and  is  clearly 
highly  gendered. 
 
Accumulation through cattle production is occurring in some CPA households, but it is not 
the number of livelihoods as such that shapes accumulation, but rather how key variables 
interact with each other. These include the depth of income sources (in terms of both 
range and number); the impact of household shocks, particularly the death, retrenchment or 
long-term unemployment of a household head; cattle deaths, fertility problems and stock 
theft; the numbers of cattle originally  acquired, particularly via inheritance; and whether 
or not CPA production supports household farming activities, and to what extent. 
 
Sharp declines in some households’ production result from high rates of herd off-take 
(through sales and the ceremonial use of cattle) exceeding rates of replacement in raising 
calves, purchases, bridewealth and other cattle transfers. However, where CPAs disburse 
surplus cattle (often young females, or heifers) to household members and subsidise 
household farming (through inputs and labour) to a significant degree, households are 
able to re-invest in cattle production and reverse the decline in herd sizes, or maintain 
their cattle herds at more or less constant numbers. Some households that have had no 
significant recent shocks to their livelihood portfolios, and have also received cattle and 
farm subsidies from the CPA, can expand their cattle herds and diversify their livelihood 
sources. Where households receive no cattle or subsidies from  the  CPA,  the  farmers most 
likely to expand cattle production are those with larger herds (accumulated prior to land 
reform in particular kinds of labour tenant arrangements) and thus able to appropriate a 
larger share of grazing land. 
 
                                                          
14 On the basis of survey data, different ‘asset groups’ were created by organising households hierarchically into four quartiles based on 
the total number of assets (domestic, agricultural, communication and transport) owned, as a proxy for wealth status. Households 
accumulating wealth were distinguished from those whose wealth status remained stable, those diversifying their livelihood sources in 
order to maintain themselves, and those who were struggling to reproduce themselves. This analysis did not employ class categories, but 




CPAs as separate farm enterprises struggle to balance three competing demands on their 
profits: (1) using income from cattle sales to meet their own operational requirements, 
particularly wages, nutritional supplements, veterinary inputs, breeding, maintaining 
infrastructure and purchase of farm implements (i.e. simple reproduction of the 
enterprise); (2) investing in expanding production, improving labour productivity, 
investing up or down the value chain, and attempts to secure niche markets (i.e. 
expanded reproduction of the enterprise); and (3) providing member households with 
benefits in the form of cash dividends, heifers, subsidised inputs to household farming or 
burial insurance (i.e. supporting social reproduction or household-based accumulation). 
Where CPA production supports household farm production in these ways, households 
often continue farming as part of a mixed livelihood strategy. Tensions between these 
competing pressures on CPA herds are at the centre of the many conflicts which have 
emerged on these farms. 
 
When CPAs are unable to provide members with substantial and increasing benefits, 
members question how farms are managed, and suspicions that farm income is being 
appropriated by CPA leaders sometimes emerge. In some cases, these have led to all 
CPA cattle being reallocated to member households, disbanding the CPA beef enterprise. 
In these CPAs, poorer households tend to fall out of farm production, placing further 
pressure on their social reproduction. On farms where CPAs no longer engage in beef 
cattle production,  class  differentiation  is  clearly  more pronounced than  on those  with 
profitable CPA cattle enterprises. In the latter, the gap between better off farmers and the  
farming  poor  is  gradually  becoming  narrower.  Accumulation  thus  articulates  with 
social reproduction in a complex manner, depending on local institutional configurations. 
 
The Besters case also demonstrates the importance of the ‘ceremonial fund’ in rural South 
Africa. Livestock play key roles in three types of ceremony at Besters – marriage, funerals 
and Christmas festivities. Marriage involves a number of transactions and inter-family 
engagements, the main ones being bridewealth, the transfer of gifts from a man’s family to 
his future wife’s family, and the transfer of gifts from the wife’s family to her husband’s 
family. In addition, aspects of European weddings have been incorporated into the final 
ceremony, which occurs over two days. The first day occurs at the bride’s natal home 
and  includes  exchanges  of  rings  and  a  religious  sermon,  and  the  second  day  at  the 
groom’s home, where dancing occurs along with invoking the lineage and its ancestors, to 
whom the new wife is introduced. 
 
In the year 2010, approximately 2.7 percent of the total cattle owned by individual 
households on the six farms were used in ceremonial slaughter, by a third of all house- 
holds. Of these households, 53 percent slaughtered one animal, 37 percent slaughtered 
two cattle and the remaining 10 percent slaughtered  either  three  or  four  cattle.  The total 
value of these slaughtered cattle was approximately R244,000, or between R4900 and 
R19,800 per household. Agreements to pay lobolo involved as few as six cattle to as 
many as 15 cattle. In addition, cattle sales are crucial for generating the cash to cover the 




amounted to around R82,000, and required the sale of 13 lobolo cattle and five other 
cattle, and involved the slaughter  of three cattle  and four goats,  in addition to cash 
derived from the wages of the bridegroom. Similarly, ceremonies relating to the dead  
are  also  extended  affairs,  in  some  cases  involving  the  slaughter  of  four  to  five cattle 
and several goats. 
 
Not all households on the Besters land reform farms own the four or five cattle, the herds 
of goats or the cash required to fund such lavish marriage or mourning feasts. This is 
reflected in a new idiom for burial ceremonies: a ‘bus ceremony’ is one where cattle are 
slaughtered, and is well attended by families and neighbours, and is distinguished from 
a ‘taxi ceremony’, where only a goat is slaughtered and far fewer people attend. 
Ceremonies involve the distribution of meat, food and drink, easing the pressure on the 
social reproduction of poor households to a degree, but also serve to bolster the social 
status and esteem of wealthier households and their ability to influence CPA decisions. 
Differential capacity to fund expenditure on ceremonies, a  key  aspect  of social 
reproduction at Besters, thus both reflects and tends to further deepen social differentiation 
within land-holding groups. 
 
The Besters case illustrates the complex and shifting relations between wage labour, 
agricultural commodity production, and state welfare grants in the social reproduction of 
households located in South Africa’s rural areas. For some households on land reform 
farms, income sources are mutually supportive and enable increased levels of income 
and even accumulation, but for others, declining cattle herds both reflect and contribute to 
a diminished capacity to secure their reproduction. The profitability of CPA cattle 
enterprises and the distribution of surplus income are at the centre of a range of tensions 
and conflicts on land reform farms in Besters populated by both ‘fragmented classes of 
labour’ and aspiring rural accumulators. 
 
Social reproduction in rural South Africa: lessons from the case studies 
The cases described above illustrate key  aspects of social  reproduction  in rural South 
Africa. Firstly, land and property rights are significant in a variety of ways, despite the 
relatively small contributions of agricultural production to the incomes of most 
households. Land is pivotal for the establishment of a homestead, the locus of daily and 
generational reproduction, which is why customary norms and practices offering 
guaranteed and free access to land to accepted community members remain important. 
This resonates with Ferguson’s (2013) arguments  that land anchors a range of 
‘distributive  relations’ that involve claims on a ‘rightful share’ of resources held by 
families and networks of kin, including cash from social grants. 
 
Secondly, rural homes offer key advantages for South Africans belonging to ‘fragmented 
classes of labour’ (an appropriate characterisation for most members of rural house- 
holds). The cost of living in communal areas and on land-reform farms is significantly 
lower than in urban contexts, partly because homes are cheaper to build and maintain, 




services such as water, electricity, health and education offered at little or no cost. Care of 
children and the old at rural homes helps to anchor family structures and kinship networks, 
at a time when employment prospects are bleak and livelihood strategies are precarious. 
 
Thirdly, communal areas and land-reform farms involve rights to landed resources, used for 
the production of supplementary food and livestock and gathering of wild resources for 
consumption and sale (Shackleton, Shackleton, and Cousins 2001). Production of dryland 
crops such as the staple, maize, continues to decline, unsurprisingly given the high  
levels  of  productivity  and  efficiency  of  large-scale  commercial  farmers,  together with 
easy access to maize meal in retail outlets. In relation to irrigated crops and livestock, 
however, considerable amounts of cash income can be earned by a minority of better off 
households, often those with members in secure and well-paid employment. Agriculture 
thus also creates opportunities for accumulation, albeit limited. 
 
Fourthly, given that access to productive land is mediated by either ‘customary’ norms and 
values (communal areas), or collective property institutions (land reform farms), incipient 
processes of accumulation generate tensions and conflicts over the prospects for unequal 
benefits from shared resources. On Besters land-reform farms, this has resulted in CPAs 
becoming the site of contestations over how cattle production should be organised. In the 
Msinga irrigation schemes, greatly expanded access by would-be accumulators to irrigated 
plots (e.g. through the informal rental market) would undoubtedly generate similar 
tensions if attempted, since it would constitute a threat to the key role of fresh produce 
income in social reproduction. The informal land market in irrigated  plots allows for 
expanded access to a limited degree, given  that  it  is  ‘socially  embedded’ (only partially 
commoditised); this constitutes a key constraint on accumulation. 
 
Fifthly, customary institutions give rise to a ceremonial economy with two key features: 
(1) considerable amounts of cash (the so-called ‘ceremonial fund’) are spent in reproducing 
forms of ‘the social’ premised on the interdependence of individuals within families, kin 
networks and ‘communities’, and expressed in rituals surrounding marriage, death and 
celebrations. There is great variation in the degree to which households can afford to 
spend cash on such ceremonies, reflecting the social differentiation of social reproduction; 
and (2) livestock play key roles in ceremonies, which support a large and lucrative market 
in live animals for slaughter. Most livestock production takes place on communal grazing, a 
shared resource which benefits larger herd owners more than those with smaller herds or 
who own no animals at all. 
 
Sixthly, social institutions such as marriage are in flux, and many women bear children 
outside of stable relationships. Many rural homesteads include adult females with children, 
leading to a range of conflicts and tension, and ‘customary’ relations and identities are 
being both affirmed and subverted in processes of land allocation to female-headed 
households. ‘Custom’ is increasingly  a site of  contestation between men and women, 





Seventhly, household strategies for securing social reproduction are deeply conditioned by  
the historical/structural impacts of  capitalist development in  South Africa, past and 
present, and shaped by processes of  class  differentiation  both  in  society  at large and 
locally. This means that social  reproduction  in  rural  South  Africa  is  fraught with 
contradictions and tensions, and is thus a site of conflict as well as much social solidarity. 
A range of tensions, along axes of gender and generation, but also class, underpin localised 
forms of politics. 
 
Conclusion: social reproduction in rural areas elsewhere in the Global 
South 
Capitalist development in South Africa was shaped in fundamental ways by the specific 
manner in which class and race differences were combined in its early history. Twenty- 
three years after the end of apartheid, the structural legacies of this history continue to 
present  major  challenges  to  efforts  to  reduce  poverty  and  inequality.  What  makes 
South Africa a somewhat unique case in the Global South is the degree to which the 
land-based livelihoods of the rural population have been rendered marginal, with few 
compensating employment opportunities, as well as the extent of state transfers to the 
poor. 
 
Nevertheless, we argue that key differences between South Africa and other countries with 
large populations of rural poor are likely to be of extent rather than of kind. The conditions 
under which rural populations across many parts of the world today have to seek their 
social reproduction are present in an exaggerated form in South Africa, but are not 
fundamentally different, in our view.15 Here we note some key similarities in relation to 
labour migration, social protection, the increasing marginalisation  of  small-scale farming, 
and the contradictory relationship between accumulation and social reproduction in rural 
economies. 
 
The system of labour migration established to supply cheap labour to the South African 
mining industry in the early twentieth century was regional in scope, and many rural areas 
in neighbouring countries (e.g. Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana) had the character of labour 
reserves. Labour migration remains a common feature of rural areas across Africa more 
widely, and it continues to be so today in many regions of the world. It is increasingly 
associated with the informalisation and casualisation of employment. Rural homes across 
the globe are bases for mobile or ‘footloose’ working populations engaged in ‘fragmented’ 
(diversified, but survivalist) livelihoods (Bernstein 2010; Li 2009). 
 
While few countries in the Global South can afford to offer social protection on the scale of 
South Africa, many are experimenting with cash transfers, food aid, public works, and 
measures aimed at strengthening food security, such as input subsidies and construction of 
rural infrastructure (Devereux 2012; Li 2009). These form part of the conditions of social 





The marginalisation of small-scale agriculture is a core feature of many countries in the 
Global South, as is the paucity of formal employment and generalised rural poverty 
(Bryceson 2004). Despite widespread ‘de-agrarianisation’, however, access to land remains 
key for social reproduction. Social relations and identities in rural areas continue to be 
heavily influenced by cultural norms and values, whether framed in terms of custom or 
not. 
 
A key issue that arises from the South African case is the relationship between social 
reproduction and capitalist accumulation. Marxism argues that this is inherently 
contradictory, although there have been times and places, perhaps exceptional in character, 
when growth and social provision have been complementary. In agrarian settings, the 
manner in which social reproduction occurs can facilitate accumulation, but in other cases 
acts as a key constraint on accumulation. More broadly, as in the debate on South Africa’s 
accumulation path (Arrighi, Aschoff, and Scully 2010), the dynamics of social reproduction 
in rural settings  may  act  as  a  powerful  constraint  on  capitalist  development  more  
generally. Comparative analyses of countries with large rural populations, such as China, 
India, Brazil and South Africa, might yield insights on this issue. 
 
We argue that the dynamics of social reproduction are a key aspect of contemporary 
capitalism deservedly receiving greater attention. In the rural areas of the Global South, 
these involve a great deal more than care work, domestic  labour  and  struggles  over social 
provision, important though these be. In particular,  the social relations  through which 
households, families and communities are constituted need to be taken into account, and 
land and its subtle and varied roles in social reproduction are critically important. Gender 
relations are of course central to social reproduction, as are other social differences that 
intersect with class, but their content as well as the culturally specific forms they take is 
highly variable. 
 
Much of the material discussed in this contribution is well known; in many ways, we have 
simply re-framed data from existing literatures on South African poverty, social protection, 
rural livelihoods and land tenure in relation to wider unfolding theories of social 
reproduction. One advantage of a Marxist lens on these issues, however, is that it suggests 
that the spheres of production and reproduction should be analysed simultaneously, and in 
relation to each other. This ‘totalising’ or systemic view is a key strength of Marxist political 
economy. This is in contradistinction to the tendency in non-Marxist scholarship to simply 
assume that capitalism exists, and furthermore will always exist, which means that the effects 
of its contradictory relations can be studied and the policy (or political) implications explored, 
without critically investigating those relations themselves. In our view, social reproduction 
and its contradictions and contestations are key to struggles both within and against 
capitalism as such, and are as significant as the dynamics of production and capital 
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